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IN THE SUPREHE COURT
STATE OF UTAH
---ooOoo--UTAH DEPARTHENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
IRA HATCH, dba Marble Motel;
IRA HATCH, dba Sandman
Motel; BERTHA C. JENSEN, dba
Golden Spike Hotel, and
HELE~ REEDER, et al.,

CASE NO.

16526

Defendants-Appellants.
---ooOoo--BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
---ooOoo--NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal from orders of immediate occupancy, granted in condemnation actions brought
by the Utah Department of Transportation in regard to Appellants' nonconforming outdoor advertising signs, pursuant to
the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, section 27-12-136.1 et
seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The First District Court, the Honorable VeNoy
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Christofferson, Judge, granted Respondent's Motions for
Orders of Immediate Occupancy.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a ruling of this Court affirming
the decision of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June, July, and September, 1978, Respondent commenced condemnation actions against Appellants, seeking

me

removal of five outdoor advertising signs which have nonconforming status under the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act.
Answers were filed in three of the actions on or about Octo·
ber 17 and 18, 1978, and Respondent's Motions for Orders of
Immediate Occupancy were filed December 11, 1978.

Extensive i

legal memoranda were filed by each side in February and
March, 19 79, and hearing was held on the r.1otions on March
26, 1979.

The District Court, in its Memorandum Decision

dated April 30, 1979, granted Respondent's Motions, and on
May 23, signed Orders of Immediate Occupancy as to the five
nonconforming signs in question.
ARGUMENT
The instant actions were brought pursuant to the Uta:l
Outdoor Advertising Act, U.C.A. 27-12-136.1 et seq., which
provides for the regulation of outdoor advertising adjacent ,
to interstate and primary highways.

The Utah Act was promu:·l

gated in response to federal legislation which encouraged
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states to provide for the "effective control" of such advertising, at the peril of losing up to ten percent of
federal highway funding.

23 U.S.C. l3l(b).

The federal

law also sets out guidelines for the effective control of
outdoor advertising; and for the removal of.illegal and
nonconforming signs.

23 U.S.C. 13l(c) et seq.

Respondent

is empowered to acquire nonconforming signs by eminent domain under U.C.A. 27-12-136.11, a section of the Utah Act.
I.

IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY IS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR
UNDER THE UTAH OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ACT, AND IS
AN APPROPRIATE MEASURE TO BE CONSIDERED IN CONDEMNATION ACTIONS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THAT ACT.
As a threshold matter, it should be stressed that the
provision which grants the State the right of eminent domain
as to nonconforming advertising signs expressly incorporates
the chapter which allows the granting of orders of immediate
occupancy.

U.C.A. 27-12-136.11 states:

The [transportation].!/ commission is hereby
empowered and authorized to acquire by gift,
purchase, agreement, exchange or eminent domain, any existing outdoor advertising and all
property rights pertaining to same which were
lawfully in existence on May 9, 1967, and

y

U.C.A. 27-12-136.3(1) defines "commission" as "the state
road commission of Utah." Under U.C.A. 63-49-4(2) (a),
all "functions, powers, duties, rights and responsibilities" of the state road commission were subsequently
transferred to the Utah Department of Transportation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
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which by reason of this act become nonconforming •..• Eminent domain shall be exercised in accordance w1th the prov1s1on of
chapter 34 of Title 78.
(Emphasis added.)
The statute which provides that orders of immediate occupancy may be obtained by condemning entities is U.C.A.
78-34-9, one of the provisions of chapter 34 of Title 78.
It must be presumed that the clear language of the statute
means what it says, and t.hat the provisions of chapter 34
of Title 78, including section 78-34-9, govern exercises
of the eminent domain power under U.C.A. 27-12-136.11.
It is thus apparent that the Legislature intended
immediate occupancy to be available for the courts' consid·
eration in condemnations of nonconforming signs, subject
to the requirements set out in U.C.A. 78-34-9.
II.
RESPONDENT FULFILLED THE STATUTORY AND CASE
LAI'i REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ORDER OF IMMEDIATE
OCCUPANCY, AND THE LOvJER COURT COULD, THEREFORE, IN ITS DISCRETIOH, PROPERLY GRANT AN
ORDER OF IID!EDLZ\.TE OCCUPANCY.
As to the proof to be considered in a trial court's
consideration of a motion for an order of immediate occupancy, U.C.A. 78-34-9 provides:
The court or of
by affidavit or
premises sought
ages which will

judge thereof shall take proof
otherwise of the value of the
to be condemned and of the damaccrue from the condemnation,

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion
according to the equity of the case and the
relative damages which may accrue to the parties.
In addition, where a condemnor's right to take is centroverted, this Court has previously stated that the condemnor
may be required to make a prima facie showing of its right
to take, prior to issuance of the order.
Company v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated
Utah 423,

255 P. 672

Utah Copper
~tining

Company, 69

(1926).

In the present cases, Respondent made a prima facie
showing of its authority to take, a showing not seriously
controverted by Appellants; and submitted proof of the value
of the condemned signs and of the reasons for a speedy occupation.

It was therefore well within the lower court's dis-

cretion to grant the orders of immediate occupancy, as it
did.

A.
RESPONDENT MADE A CLEAR PRIMA FACIE SHOWING
THAT, AS A HATTER OF LA1'7, IT HAS A VALID
RIGHT TO CONDEMN APPELLANTS' NONCONFORMING
SIGNS.
In the Answers filed in these cases, Appellants
raised a number of constitutional and other legal objections
to Respondent's right to condemn the subject signs.

Mindful

that it may be required to make a prima facie showing of its

-5- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

authority to condemn, Respondent addressed each of the
constitutional and legal objections at length in its
Memorandum in Support of Hotion for Order of Immediate
Occupancy (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff's
Memorandum,") and further responded to the Defendants'
legal arguments in its l-1emorandum in Reply to Defendant's

Memorandum in Opposition (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum.")

Appellants now argue that the

hearing on the motion was not the proper forum for determination of the constitutional issues, and that evidence
needs to be presented on these issues
pp. l6f.).

(Appellants' Brief,

Respondent has some difficulty understanding

the pertinency or timeliness of this argument, since any
party was free to present whatever evidence or make whatever argument it wished in the hearing before the lower
court.

Respondent submits that, as a matter of law, Appel-

lants' constitutional arguments are uniformly without merit
and that the district court properly ruled that Respondent
has the right to condemn the subject signs.
Respondent will briefly discuss the constitutional
issues in the order in which they are mentioned in Appellants' Brief, pp. 16-22.

If the Court has further questio:

regarding any other legal arguments raised in the Answers,

-6-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

its attention is directed to the arguments made in Plain·tiff's Memorandum and Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum.
DUE PROCESS
Appellants challenge the Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act on the due process bases that aesthetic values do not
justify an exercise of the eminent domain power, the Act
is overbroad, and the condemnation of Appellants' signs
is arbitrary (Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-18).
(1)

Esthetic values justifying condemnation.

Although this Court has not yet had occasion to rule
on the State's right to condemn billboards under the Utah
Outdoor Advertising Act, other states have recognized that
highway beautification is a proper basis for exercise of
the eminent domain power.
In Wes Outdoor Advertising Company v. Goldberg, 55
N.J. 347, 262 A.

2d 199 (1970), the plaintiffs contested

the State of New Jersey's right to condemn real or personal
property adjacent to federal-aid highways, for the statutory
purpose of "restoration, preservation and enhancement of
scenic beauty along the highways."

The Court stated:

We have ~o hesitancy in stating that the restoration, preservation and enhancement of
scenic beauty adjacent to public highways is
a public use for the public welfare, filling

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a social need, of our times.
Hence, the power
to acquire lands for that purpose is beyond
judicial interference.
262 A. 2d at 202.
Also the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that under a similar
roadside beautification act, the State could constitutionally take a "scenic easement" which expressly provided for
the discontinuance of nonconforming billboards within the
restricted area; the court held this to be a proper public
use of the land.

I<amrowski v. State, 31 viis. 2d 256, 142

N.W. 2d 793 (1966).
Commission, 328 A.

And in Finks v. Maine State Highway
2d 791 (Me. 1974), where the constitu-

tionality of condemnation actions under the Maine Roadside
Beautification Act was contested, the court cited language
from the Wes Outdoor Advertising and I<amrowski cases dealing
with the question, and simply stated, "We fully agree."
A.

32f

2d at 794.
Of related interest are cases dealing with beautifi·

cation and esthetic enhancement as valid bases for the exer·
cise of the police power.

It is rudimentary that the police

power may be exercised to promote the public health, safety,
and general welfare.

The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act

expressly seeks to serve these objectives, as well as to
protect the public investment in highways and to preserve
the scenic beauty of adjoining lands.

U.C.A.

27-12-136.2-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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In considering the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
requiring the removal of unsightly material from land, this
Court has held that esthetic enhancement is a part of the
general welfare for police power purposes:
Surely among the factors which may be considered in the general welfare, is the taking
of reasonable measures to minimize discordant,
unsightly and offensive surroundings; and to
preserve the beauty as well as the usefullness
of the environment.
Buhler v, Stone, 533 P.2d
292, 294 (Utah, 1975).
Thus, the purposes of the Utah Outdoor Advertis·ing Act would
be sufficient to justify an exercise of the State's police
power were that pmver involved here; a fortiori, they must
be considered as justifying an exercise of the less harsh
.

em~nent

~/

d oma~n
. power.2/

As the court in Kamrowski v. State,

Numerous courts have upheld billboard statutes, where
no compensation for removal of signs was offered, as
valid exercises of the police power, on the bases of
public safety, esthetic enhancement, furtherance of
the public welfare, preservation of the public's right
to privacy, economics, urban renewal, or a combination
of these bases. E.g., Iowa Department of Transportation
v. Nebraska-Iowa Supply Company, 272 N.W. 2d 6 (Iowa,
1978); John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp.
1272 (D. Me., 1978); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268
N.W. 2d 741
(N.D. I 1978) appeal dismissed, 99 s.ct.
1205 (1979); Veterans of Fore~gn Wars, Post 4264 v.
City of Steamboat Springs, 575 P. 2d 835 (Colo.,
1978) appeal dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 66 (1978); Lubbock
Poster Company v. City of Lubbock, 569 S.W. 2d 935
(Tex. App., 1978), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 63 (1979);
State v. National Advertising Company, 356 So. 2d 557
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

supra, regarding a roadside beautification law, stated:
Nhatever may be the law with respect to
zoning restrictions based upon aesthetic
considerations, a stronger argument can
be made in support of the power to take
property, in return for just compensation,
in order to fulfill aesthetic concepts,
than for the imposition of police power
restrictions for such purposes.
142 N.W.
2d at 797.
(Emphasis added.)
The Legislature has determined that valid public
purposes will be served by the condemnation of nonconforminq

.Y

(continued)
(La. App., 1978); Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Ber1e,
43 N.Y. 2d 468, 373 N.E. 2d 255 (1977), appeal dismissed,
99 S. Ct. 66 (1978); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Company,
Inc. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y. 2d 483, 373 N.E. 2d 263 (1977),
appeal dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 66 (1978); Donnelly Advertisir:
Corp. of Maryland v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 370
A.2d 1127 (1977); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor
Advertising Board, 339 N.E. 2d 709 (Mass., 1975); Town o:
Boothbay v. National Advertising Company, 347 A.2d~
(Me., 1975); Mississippi State Highway Commission v.
Roberts Enterprises, Inc., 304 So. 2d 637 (Miss., 1974):
Westfield Motor Sales Company v. Town of Westfield, 129 '
N.J. Super. 528, 324 A.2d 113 (1974); Art Neon Company
v. City and County of Denver, 448 F.2d 118 (lOth Cir.,
1973), cert. den., 417 u.s. 972 (1973); Howard v. State
Department of Highways of Colorado, 478 F.2d 581 (10~
C~r., 1973); Markham Advertis~ng Company v. State, 73 .
lvash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), Appeal dismissed, 39:
U.S. 316, reh. den., 393 U.S. 1112 (1969); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Company of Minnesota v. Village of
j
Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W. 2d 206 (1968); ~'
v. Diamond Motors, 50 Haw. 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); ~
v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. App., 1964); Ghaster Prope;·
Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E. 2d 328 (196'
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signs under the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, and that such
an exercise of the eminent domain power is compatible with
the greatest public good and least private injury.

The

district court properly refrained from substituting its
judgment in the matter.
(2)

Overbreadth, arbitrariness.

Appellants' further

due process arguments ignore the reasonable and orderly method
of regulation set up by the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, pursuant to and in furtherance of legislative findings that such
regulation serves the public safety and welfare.

U.C.A. 27-

12-136.2, a section of the Act, states:
The purpose of this act is to provide the
statutory basis for the regulation of outdoor
advertising consistent with zoning principles
and standards and the public policy of this
state in providing public safety, health, welfare, convenience and enjoyment of public travel,
to protect the public investment in such highways,
and to ensure that information in the specific
interest of the traveling public is presented
safely and effectively.
The Act then specifies what signs may and may not be permitted
along controlled highways under the Act, U.C.A. 27-12-136.4,
and provides for the removal of nonconforming signs by
eminent domain or other lawful means, U.C.A. 27-12-136.11.
Respondent submits that the Act, on its face, serves important, articulated goals of safety, welfare, and financial
and esthetic preservation by means of a well-defined system
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of regulation, and that Appellants suggested nothing which
would have justified the lower court's acting as a superlegislature by ruling the statutory scheme unreasonable.
No dispute exists in this case as to the fact that Appellants' signs are nonconforming under the Act.
Regarding Appellants' charge of arbitrariness, it
is the Utah Legislature, and not Respondent, which promulgated the statutory criteria for nonconforming signs; also, '
evidence before the lower court indicated that more than
87% of nonconforming signs had been acquired for removal
prior to hearing in these cases (Affidavit of Dean W. Holbrook, appended to Plaintiff's Reply Hemorandum).

There

simply is no legal substance in Appellants' due process
arguments.

(See also Plaintiff's Memorandum, pp. 5-7, for

decisions from other jurisdictions upholding outdoor advertising laws under due process attack.)
EQUAL PROTECTION
Appellants argue that the Act's distinction between
the permissibility of signs in commercial and noncommercial
areas may not be reasonable, and therefore violates the
equal protection doctrine.
As to any legislative classification, including the'
pertaining to outdoor advertising, the equal protection
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standard set out by the United States Supreme Court in
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489,
75 S.Ct. 461, 465 (1955), applies:
The problem of legislative classification is
a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire
definition. Evils in the same field may be
of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think •...
Or the reform may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the
phase of the problem which seems most acute
to the legislative mind ...• The legislature
may select one phase of one field and apply
a remedy there, neglecting the others ..••
The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause
goes no further than the invidious discrimination.
In the present cases, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose
that the Utah Legislature concluded that regulation of outdoor advertising along interstate and primary highways
would serve the public safety and welfare, by protecting
the public investment in such highways and preserving the
scenic beauty of adjoining lands.

The means adopted by the

Utah Act are reasonably related to that purpose, and apply
across-the-board to all who, like Appellants, own nonconforming signs.

The district court properly refrained from

second-guessing the Legislature's choice of statutory means
in effectuating valid public purposes, and Appellants'
agrument on the basis of equal protection must also fail.
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In addition, the Court's attention is drawn to
pages 8-11 of Plaintiff's Memorandum, which discusses oilier
states' outdoor advertising laws which have been upheld
under equal protection attack.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Appellants also aver that the Utah Act violates
free speech (Appellants' Brief, p. 19), and in support of
this contention, cite one 1977 unpublished opinion from a
California trial court.

This argument ignores repeated

holdings by state and federal courts, including the California Supreme Court, that billboard la\vS do not violate
First Amendment guarantees.

Most recently, in Metromedia,

,

Inc. v. City of San Diego, 23 Cal.3d 762,592 P.2d 728 (1919'!
the California Court upheld a city ordinance that, far more

1

harshly than the Utah Act, would ban substantially all off·
site billboards from an entire city.

The Court reviewed

other jurisdicitions' decisions, and found that a

. .t

i

"unan~ml Y

1

of published decisions supports the proposition that such
an ordinance does not abridge freedom of speech."
742.

Id. at

While a rehearing has been granted in Metromedia, ~,

at 728, Respondent submits that the reasoning of the major· i
i ty and concurring opinions is even more persuasive in the
present case, where a less harsh regulatory scheme is at
issue.
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1

The Metromedia court cited Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Company v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263
(1977), in which a community-wide ban on off-site billboards was upheld under First Amendment attack.

An appeal

from that decision was dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question by the U.S. Supreme Court, 99 S.Ct. 66
(1978).

The

Metromedia court stated:

Since the Supreme Court regards such a dismissal as a decision on the merits (Hicks v.
Miranda (1975) 422 u.s. 332, 95 s.ct. 2281,
45 L.Ed.2d 225), we conclude that the highcourt has resolved that its commercial speech
cases are not inconsistent with ordinances
prohibiting off-site billboards. The dismissal of the appeal in Suffolk Outdoor Advert~s
ing authoritatively establishes that such ordinances do not v~olate the F~rst Amendment.
592 P.2d at 739 (emphas~s added).
Precisely the same principle applies to the U.S.
Supreme Court's dismissal on the merits of an appeal in
Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.l'l. 2d 741 (N.D., 1978),
appeal dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 1205 (1979).

In that case, the

North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a state outdoor advertising act, identical in substance to the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, and held that the act did not violate the
First Amendment (see Plaintiff's Memorandum, pp. 15-16).
The Metromedia court also found that the ordinance
did not seek to suppress the content of any advertiser's
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message; served significant governmental interests (i.e.,
traffic safety and community esthetics) unrelated to the
suppression of free speech; and left open adequate alternate means of communication; and therefore did not abridge
freedom of speech.

592 P.2d at 740.

Respondent submits

that this analysis is of even greater validity when applied to the Utah Act, involving, as it does, the prohibition of billboards only in certain defined areas.
Also, in State v. Lotze, 92 Wash.2d, 52, 593 P.2d
811, appeal filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3250

(1979), an opinion

poo-

lished since memoranda were filed with the district court in
this case, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Washington outdoor advertising law, identical in all pertinent
substantive aspects to the Utah Act, does not violate the
First Amendment, even when applied to signs containing noncommercial, political messages.

The Court found that the

State's concern with traffic safety was sufficiently compelling to outweigh the "minimal restraint placed on advertising by the law," and that the "statutory scheme represents a reasonable place and manner limitation on speech
leaving ample alternative channels of communication .... "
Id. at 815

Rather than providing a recitation here of the dozen
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or so recent, well-reasoned state and federal court decisions which hold that billboard regulations do no violate freedom of speech,

Respondent directs the Court's

attention to the cases cited at pages 12-18 of Plaintiff's
Memorandum.

Of particular precedential value here are the

decisions in John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp.
1272 (D.Me., 1978), Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.
2d 741 (N.D., 1978), appeal dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 1205 (1979),
State v. National Advertising Company, 356 So.2d 557 (La.
App., 1978), and Howard v. State Department of Highways of
Colorado, 478 F.2d 581 (lOth Cir., 1973), in which beautification acts substantially the same as Utah's, enacted
pursuant to the-federal highway beautification statute
(23 U.S.C. 131), have been uniformly upheld as not violative of freedom of speech.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 13
Article XIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution
state in pertinent part:
The proceeds from the imposition of any license
tax, registration fee, driver education
tax, or other charge related to the operation of any motor vehicle upon any public highway in this state, and the proceeds
from the imposition of any excise tax on
gasoline or _other liquid motor fuel used
for propelling such vehicles, except for
statutory refunds and adjustments allowed
thereunder and for costs of collection and

-17-
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administration, shall be used exclusively for
highway purposes as follows:
(1)
The construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of city streets, county roads, and
state highways, including but not restricted
to payment for property taken for or damaged
by rights of way, and for administrative costs
necessarily incurred for said purposes ...•
Appellants have contended that expenditures under the Outdoor Advertising Act would constitute an unlawful diversion
of state highway funds under this section (App·ellants 1 Brie:.!

I

p. 20; Eleventh Defense in Answer).
Appellants apparently overlook the fact that state
highway funds r.1ay be expended for the "improvement •.. and
maintenance of ... state highways ...• "

The clear purpose

of this section is to prevent the diversion of highway funds
to non-highway-related expenditures.

On the other hand,

expenditures authorized under the Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act are intended to improve and maintain the safety and
scenic beauty of Utah 1 s highways.

The breadth of the term: ·

"improvement" and "maintenance" in the constitutional pro·
vision indicates that its purpose is not to prevent the
Legislature from directing expenditures validly related

~

protecting the public investment in highways and enhancing '
the safety and enjoyment of highway travel.
The purposes of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act,
as enumerated in U.C.A. 27-12-136.2, are, inter alia, to
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'

provide for the regulation of outdoor advertising in the
interests of the public's safety, welfare, and convenience and enjoyment of public travel;"
••• to protect the public investment in such
highways, to preserve the natural scenic
beauty of lands bordering on such highways,
and to ensure that information in the specific
interest of the traveling public is presented
safely and effectively.
Plaintiff submits that these purposes clearly fall
within the purview of highway "improvement and maintenance."
It cannot be reasonably argued that Article XIII, Section
13 entirely prevents the Utah Department of Transportation
from making expenditures for the safety, convenience, and
enjoyment of highway users, or the preservation of the
economic and scenic value of highways in the State.
In Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549 (N.D., 1965),
an argument substantially the same as Defendant's was rejecte'd by the North Dakota Supreme Court.

There, a taxpayer

sought to enjoin the expenditure of state highway funds
for the acquisition of outdoor advertising outside of the
highway right-of-way, alleging that such an expenditure
would violate Article 56 of the North Dakota Constitution.
That provision, very similar to the Utah provision, states
~hat

proceeds from motor fuel taxes and from license and reg-

istration fees are to be expended "solely for construction,
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repair and maintenance of public highways ..•. "

The Court

stated:
It is clear the purpose of the amendment was
to prevent any use of the earmarked revenues
for anything but highway purposes and not to
restrict the terms of the amendment by a narrow construction of the purpose for which the
revenues may be used within the area designated.
Id. at 557.
On its face, the Utah constitutional provision serves the
same purpose, and a similar rule of construction should be
applied to the Utah provision.

It should further be

stressed that, on the basis of the constitutional language
alone, the Utah provision gives even stronger justification
for the validity of the proposed condemnation expenditure
than the North Dakota provision examined in Newman v.
Hjelle.

The latter section allowed expenditures only "for

construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of
public highways •.•. "

The Utah constitutional provision,

on the other hand, allows expenditures of highway funds
for the "construction, improvement, repair and maintenance
of . • . state highways •... "

As indica ted above, it is

evident that the purposes of the Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act (traffic safety, convenience and enjoyment of travel,
esthetic enhancement) fall well within the broad standard
of highway "improvement."

Expenditures under the Utah

-20-
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Outdoor Advertising Act do not violate the constitutional
provision, and the district court was fully justified in
finding the state's right to condemn unimpaired on this
basis.
ESTOPPEL
Appellants have also argued that Respondent should
be estopped from condemning the subject signs by reason of
the previous issuance of permits for the signs (Appellants'
Brief, p. 20; Twelfth Defense in Answer).

The district

court properly rejected this argument as a matter of law.
First, the general rule regarding the application
of equitable esto.ppel to governmental actions has been
stated as follows:

An equitable estoppel ordinarily may not be
invoked against a government or public
agency functioning in its governmental capacity; but where the elements of an estoppel are present it may be asserted against
the government when acting in its proprietary
capacity. 31 C.J.S., Estoppel 138, p. 675.
An argument similar to Defendant's was advanced by
the plaintiffs in John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F.
Supp. 1272

(D. Me., 1978).

There it was claimed that the

State of Maine should be estopped from requiring removal
of off-premise signs for which permits had been issued
under previous legislation.

Rejecting that argument, the

court noted its adherence to "the general rule that when
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the legislature acts in its governmental or sovereign
capacity, as opposed to a business or proprietary role,
the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable."

453 F.Supp.

at 1282.
In the present case, it is indisputable that the
State is acting in its sovereign, and not in its proprietary, capacity.

The simple fact that Plaintiff has been

legislatively authorized to exercise the eminent domain
power demonstrates that the State is performing a governmental function in regulating billboards, and not merely
acting as a property owner.
Second, the mere fact that Appellants may have
previously received permits for their signs, in accordance
with the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, provides no basis
for invoking equitable estoppel.

By renewing Appellants'

permits, in accordance with statutory requirement (see
U.C.A. 27-12-136.7), Respondent certainly made no representation that Appellants' billboards could remain in place
forever.

Appellants must be presumed to have known that

their nonconforming signs were subject to condemnation at
any time under u.c.A. 27-12-136.11.
This Court has previously stated:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not
operate in favor of one who has knowledge
of the essential facts or who has convenient
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and available means of obtaining such knowledge. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549
P.2d 695, 697 n. 4 (Utah, 1976).
In the present case, Respondent has only followed the procedures dictated by statute in issuing licenses
27-12-136.7) until such time that

Appellant~'

(U.C.A.

nonconforming

signs could be condemned (U.C.A. 27-12-136.10-11), and no
suggestion has been made by Appellants that such procedure
was not followed.

Sign owners must be presumed to have

available means of learning what the statutes on signs provide.

In short, no basis has been suggested or exists for

estopping these actions, and the lower court properly disregarded Appellants' argument on this score.
Other courts' decisions, rejecting efforts to estop
enforcement of billboard laws, are discussed in Plaintiff's
Memorandum, at page 28.
23

u.s.c.

13l(o)

Appellants seek to rely on 23 U.S.C. 131(o), a section of the federal highway beautification act, which states:
The Secretary may approve the request o£ a
State to permit retention in specific areas
defined by such State of directional signs,
displays, and devices lawfully erected under State law in force at the time of their
erection which do not conform to the requirements of subsection (c), where such signs,
displays, and devices are in existence on
the date of enactment of this subsection and
where the State demonstrates that such signs,
displays, and devices (1) provide directional
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information about goods and services in the
interest of the travelling public, and (2)
are such that removal would work a substantial economic hardship in such defined area.
Appellants advance the peculiar argument that, by not making application under this section, the State has failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies, and that this so-called
failure somehow adversely affects Respondent's eminent domain power (Appellants" Brief, p. 20).
Respondent confesses itself at an utter loss to
determine any way in which section 13l(o) vitiates the
State's authority to condemn nonconforming signs.

The fed-

eral statute permits states to apply for hardship exemptions
for certain signs, if the states choose to do so, but does
not mandate such requests, or make the states' power to
condemn nonconforming signs contingent upon exercise of
the discretionary privilege granted in section 13l(o).
That any application under 13l(o) was intended to
be left to the states' discretion is attested both by a
reasonable reading of the statutory language itself and by
the section's legislative history.

In 1976, when the U.S.

Senate considered the bill containing section 13l(o), the
following exchange occurred while Senator Bentsen, chairman
of the Sub-Committee on Transportation of the Committee on
Public Works, reported on the conference cornrni ttee' s consk
eration of the proposed amendments:
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MR. STEVENSON.
Section 122(b) (o) amends
section 131 of title 23, United States
Code, by adding that the Secretary of
Transportation may approve the request of
a State to permit retention in specific
areas of directional signs providing information about goods and services.
Do I understand correctly that a State may,
if i t so chooses, elect not to permit such
signs?
MR. BENTSEN.
rna choose

State
s.
122

nc~o~n~g~.~R'-e~c~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~added).

Senator Baker, the ranking minority member of the Public
Works Committee, and a member of the conference committee
which considered section 13l(o), stated:
We also added a new provision to assist
those areas in a State which may suffer
severe economic hardship if all existing
signs are required to be removed. This
would permit States to define these areas
and ask the Secretary of Transportation
to permit retention of billboards which
would otherwise be illegal. The measure
is intended to relieve adverse economic
impacts throughout an area.
It is not
designed to provide relief to individual
businesses which claim possible economic
detriment as a result of sign removal.
Id. at 10746 (emphasis added).
Thus, it was clearly contemplated that section 13l(o) would
permit states to apply for a hardship exemption, but no
mention is made of requiring states to take any action at
all, including the promulgation of rules and regulations.
No legislative history or statutory language of which
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Respondent is aware would justify the interpretation of
section 13l(o) advanced by Appellants in this case.
Respondent has previously considered the exemption provided for in section 13l(o), and has declined to
apply for any such exemption.

The federal statute makes

no requirement of any affirmative action by the State, and
has no effect on the State's power to condemn nonconforming outdoor advertising signs.
Finally, Appellants cite State v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P.2d
926

(1958), as supportive of the proposition that, "where

challenges are made to the right to condemn, a condemnor
will not be granted an order of immediate occupancy."
(Defendant's Memorandum, p. 14).

The D.&R.G.W. case is in-

apposite here for several reasons:

(1) In that case, boili

condemnor and condemnee were empowered to exercise the
right of eminent domain, and the case therefore centered
on the question of highest and best use of the subject
property.

(2)

However, the condmnor at the hearing on

its motion for an order of immediate occupancy failed to
request any determination as to whether the proposed improvement would constitute a higher and better use than
the existing improvement.

(3)

The D.&R.G.W. Court indi-

cated that questions of a right to condemn generally would
not interfere with issuance of an order of immediate
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occupancy.

Summarizing that case, the Court stated:

Both plaintiff and defendant are empowered to
exercise the right of eminent domain. This
case, therefore, is somewhat of a rarity, requiring a determination as to whether the
exercise of the one power or the other will
better promote the public good, -- a situation not involved in substantially all condemnation cases in this state, where the
sovereign is seeking condemnation of property
belonging to one not enjoying such power. In
the latter type of case it has been considered
routine to grant motions for immediate occupancy, since generally it is quite obvious
that no question of higher and better use will
or can arise or that the right to condemn is
debatable.
The granting of a motion for immediate occupancy has been held by this court primarily to
be one directed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, reversible only because of obvious abuse there; that the order resulting
from such motion is interlocutory in nature,
and that the matter of determining any right
to condemn is one for consideration at the
trial at which the issues generally are determined.
8 Utah 2d at 238 (emphasis added).
Respondent submits that the district court properly
found Appellants' objections to be without foundation, and
ruled as a matter of law that the State has the right to
condemn the subject signs.

Nevertheless, even assuming

arguendo that Appellant's constitutional claims could be
shown to have some viability, both U.C.A. 78-34-9, the
statute governing orders of immediate occupancy, and the
D.&R.G.W. case indicate that these issued may be determined
at trial, and that an order of immediate occupancy may, in
the trial court's discretion, be granted in the meantime.
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In su::-., the record indicates

t~at

the constitu-

tional and legal objections raised by Appellants were
fully briefed prior to argument on the motion for an order
of irmnediate occupancy; that Appellants were free to offer
whatever factual evidence they felt was pertinent to those
issues at the hearing in the matter; and that, as

c.

result,

the district court could and did properly rule that the
State had made out a prima facie showing of it? right to
take, and that the objections raised by Appellants were
not sufficient to rebut that showing.
B.
RESPONDENT HADE A PROPER SHOWING AS TO THE
REASONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ORDERS OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY, BASED UPON THE STATUTORY AIHS
OF THE UTAH OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ACT, AND IT
WAS WELL WITHIN THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISCRETION TO GRANT THE ORDERS.
U.C.A. 78-34-9, as indicated above, requires a
condemnor seeking an order of immediate occupancy to show,
by affidavit or otherwise, the value of the property sought
to be condemned, and the reasons for a speedy occupation.
As to the first requirement, Respondent submitted the
affidavits of Glenwood B. Larrabee and Ward
testifying to the value of the subject signs
tiff's Reply Hemorandum in each case).

c.

Ragner,

(see Plain-

No dispute exists

between the parties as to this requirement having been
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fulfilled.
As to the second requirement, that of showing the
reasons for a speedy occupation, Respondent submits that
the district court had before it ample showing as to the
reasons for immediate occupancy to sustain its discretionary order granting occupancy.
First, it should be stressed that, unlike the large
majority of condemnation actions, in the instant cases
the necessity of condemning a certain specifically defined
class of property for articulated public purposes is mandated by the statute which grants the eminent domain power.
That is, the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act directs that
nonconforming signs be removed, by purchase, condemnation,
or other legal means, in furtherance of the purposes set
out in U.C.A. 27-12-136.2; this is not a case in which a
condemnor has discretion in planning the design, timing,
and location of a public improvement, so that the necessity
or design of the improvement would be validly open to judicial scrutiny.

In this case, the Legislature has deter-

mined that the removal of defined nonconforming uses will
further the public purposes set out in U. C.A. 27-12-136.2;
Appellants have not disputed the fact that their signs are
nonconforming, and given the legislative mandate involved,
no question of the ultimate necessity of condemnation
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viably exists in this case.
Thus, the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act is in the
nature of a zoning regulation, requiring the removal of
certain nonconforming uses after an amortization period
(U.C.A. 27-12-136.10) in furtherance of the "public safety,
health,

[and) welfare" and "consistent with zoning principl'

and standards ... "

(U.C.A. 27-12-136.2).

It is true that

the Act provides for compensation to be paid for nonconforming signs, in addition to an amortization period, but
this does not change the basic nature of the Act as a zoning law.

The district court's order was fully consonant

with the policy of the law to eliminate nonconforming uses
as rapidly as is feasible under the law.
Because nonconforming uses and structures,
so long as they exist, prevent the full realization of the zoning plan, the spirit of zoning is, and has been, to restrict, rather than
increase, such nonconformities, and to eliminate such uses as speedily as possible.
2 Rathdopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning
(3d ed.), ch. 62.
In short, in considering the need for immediate occupancy,
the district court had before it a legislative determination that the removal of nonconforming signs would serve
important public purposes.

Appellants' implication that

an order of immediate occupancy is only appropriate to
avoid direct pecuniary loss

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 4-8)

ignores the other valid interests served by the Outdoor
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Advertising Act -- i.e., the protection of public safety
and of the public investment in interstate and primary
highways; enhancement of the enjoyment of public travel;
and preservation of the natural scenic beauty of the lands
bordering on controlled highways.

Extensiv~

evidence that

these aims are served by the removal of nonconforming
signs would have been superfluous, since that determination
has already been made by the Legislature and was binding
upon the district court.
Second, the district court had before it in each
case a resolution by the Utah Department of Transportation,
whereby the Department found and determined:
... the public interest and necessity require
that an outdoor advertising sign and the
right to maintain the same upon the real
property, hereinafter described, be terminated by removal of said sign structure.
The removal of said sign structure and the
termination of the right to thereafter maintain a controlled outdoor advertising structure and sign on the site will be most
compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury and carries out and
fulfills the requirements of the law as declared in Title 27, Chapter 12, Section 136.2,
Paragraph No. 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended.
(See Complaint in each case.)
In each resolution, the Department also requests that the
Utah Attorney General's Office seek an order of immediate
occupancy, "permitting said Department to . • • take possession of and remove the outdoor advertising structure and
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sign described in this Resolution."
The district court therefore had before it, not
only a legislative determination that the removal of nonconforming signs serves certain public purposes, but also
an administrative determination that the removal of Appel~d

lants' particular signs would serve the public interest
necessity, would be compatible with the greatest public

good and the least private injury, would fulfill the purposes of U.C.A. 27-12-136.2, and should be effectuated by
means of an order of immediate occupancy.

It is well set-

tled that substantial judicial deference will be shown to
a governmental condemnor's determination of the necessity
of taking property for a public improvement, properly
expressed by resolution.
(Utah, 1975).

Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236

Respondent submits that the district court

could and did properly consider the Department's administrative resolutions as probative of the need for removal
of Appellants' signs by means of an order of immediate
occupancy.
Finally, the district court had before it further
evidence of the reasons for speedy occupation in the Affidavit of Dean 1'<. Holbrook, appended to Plaintiff's Reply
Memorandum in each case.

Mr. Holbrook's Affidavit indi-

cated that, as of January 15, 1979, two months prior to
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hearing on the orders, Respondent had acquired for removal
2,167 signs which were nonconforming and compensable under
the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, in addition to having
removed some 7,550 illegal, noncompensable signs; 321 nonconforming signs remained as of that date.

Of the noncon-

forming signs which remained standing, condemnation suits
involving thirty-one signs had at that time been filed;
orders of immediate occupancy had been granted·as to sixteen of such signs, and denied as to six.

Mr. Holbrook's

Affidavit indicated that Respondent intended "to continue to
seek removal of such [nonconforming]

signs through condemna-

tion in as expeditious a manner as possible."

(In light of

all this, Appellants' assertion that "Plaintiff has chosen
to ignore more than two hundred and fifty (250) other nonconforming signs throughout the State"

(Appellant's Brief,

p. 10) is rather misleading, to say the least.)
The facts that Respondent had acquired for removal
nearly 90% of the nonconforming signs which existed when the
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act took effect, and nearly all of
the illegal signs which had existed since that date, were
thus before the district court.

Based upon

~his,

Respondent

argued that orders of immediate occupancy in sign condemnacases are appropriate means of ensuring that the removal of
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nonconforming signs may continue in an orderly and reasonably expeditious way; and that this should hold true
particularly where, as in the present cases, no viable
objection as to the right to take or the nonconforming
status of the signs has been raised, and the matter of
compensation will be determined at trial.

(Plaintiff's

Reply Memorandum, p. 7).
Respondent also readily conceded that a sign
owner may have or believe he has a legitimate dispute with
the State as to the amount of compensation to which he is
entitled for his condemned property.

This fact alone, how-

ever, does not justify a denial of an order of immediate
occupancy, which denial would allow nonconforming signs
additional months and years in which to remain standing
while a condemnation action languishes on through discovery
a trial, and an appeal.

Questions of compensation are

r~

served for trial and are not affected by the granting of
an order of immediate occupancy.

U.C.A.

78-34-9.

The

public has a valid interest in the removal of nonconforming signs, for the purposes enunciated in U.C.A.

27-12-

136.2; in weighing the equities of the case, the public's
interest in the protection of its highway investment and
in the enhancement of safe automobile travel and of the
state's scenic beauty could properly be deemed to outweig:
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the interest of any private sign owner in delaying the
removal of nonconforming signs for the duration of what
may be a lengthy condemnation proceeding.
In sum, Respondent submits that the district court
had before i t adequate evidence, showing reasons for orders
of immediate occupancy, and those orders should now be affirmed.
III.
THIS COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY DEFERRED TO
THE DISTRICT COURTS' DISCRETION IN THE GRANTING OF ORDERS OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY, PARTICULARLY WHERE, AS HERE, THE RECORD REVEALS NO
OBVIOUS ABUSE OF THAT DISCRETION.
As previously noted, the following standard governs
the review by this Court of orders of immediate occupancy:
The granting of a motion for immediate occupancy has been held by this court primarily
to be one directed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, reversible only because
of obvious abuse thereof; that the order resulting from such motion is interlocutory in
nature, and that the matter of determining
any right to condemn is one for consideration
at the trial at which the issues generally are
determined.
State v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, supra, 8 Utah 2d
at 238.
Based upon U.C.A. 78-34-9, the Court has also stated, " ••• on
a motion for immediate occupancy the trial court is empowered
to grant or deny the motion according to the equity of the
case," Bountiful v. Swift, supra, 535 P.2d at 1238; and only
recently, the Court reiterated, "Where such an order is supported
bythe S.J.
ample
evidence
it
is not
arbitrary
not
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be disturbed on appeal."

Utah Department of Transporta-

tion v. Fuller, docket no. 16404 (Utah, filed November
14, 1979).
Respondent submits that, in weighing the equities
in the present cases, the district court could reasonably
conclude that the public's interest in safety, scenic
preservation, and protection of its investment

i~

public

highways would outweigh the alleged monetary harm to be
suffered by Appellants.

In light of this, and the record

and evidence before the district court, no abuse of discretion is manifest, and this Court should thus defer to
the discretion of the district court in the matter.
CONCLUSION
Orders of immediate occupancy are appropriate for
the courts' consideration in condemnation actions of this
kind, as evidenced by the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act's
incorporation of the provisions of Title 78, chapter 34
(U.C.A. 27-12-136.11, 78-34-9).
In the instant cases, because Respondent's right
to take was controverted, Respondent made a prima facie
showing on legal grounds of its right to take, a showing
that was not successfully rebutted by Appellants.

In addi·

tion, the district court had before i t the Legislature's
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determination that the removal of nonconforming signs
would serve important public purposes (U.C.A. 27-12-136.2);
copies of valid administrative resolutions determining
that removal of Appellants' signs would serve those public
purposes, and requesting that orders of immediate occupancy be obtained; and affidavits evidencing (1) the value
of Appellants' signs and (2) the fact that removal of
Appellants' signs would be in furtherance of an orderly
acquisition and removal scheme undertaken by Respondent,
pursuant to which over 87% of nonconforming signs had been
previously acquired, and which was continuing at that time.
(These cases thus differ from the great majority of condemnation cases, since here, the statutory enactment was
in the nature of a zoning ordinance, and the question of
public necessity was conclusively determined by the Legislature, and was not subject to administrative discretion.)
Given this record, all statutory and case law prerequisites
for an order of immediate occupancy were fulfilled, and
the district court had before it ample evidence of "the
reasons for ... a speedy occupation."

U.C.A., 78-34-9.

In its weighing of the equities, the district court could
well have concluded that the public good to be served by
immediate removal of the signs outweighed

any damages which

would accrue to Appellants.
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Motions for immediate occupancy have been held to
be directed primarily to the discretion of the trial court.
Respondent submits that no abuse of discretion is manifest
in these cases, and respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the orders of immediate occupancy granted by the
district court.
DATED this

;;J-#h day

of December, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General

~~
STEHENJ~

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to
Thomas T. Billings, of and for PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER,
Attorneys for Appellants, 79 South State Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 on this

;:L/J/1

day of December, 1979.
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